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RECENT CASES 89
which anyone has been ordered, by an interlocutory decree, to purchase
either intangible personal property or services. The lack of precedent coupled
with the caution with which most courts grant interlocutory mandatory in-
junctions would seem to render this case questionable as authority for
future decisions.
ROBERT N. OPLAND
INTERNAL REVENUE - NATURE AND EXTENT OF TAXING POWER-POW-
ER TO TAX AND REGULATE-Defendants were convicted for failure to
pay a gamblers' occupational tax imposed by an act of Congress.' The
act levied a special tax of $50 per year on every person engaged in receiv-
ing wagers for or on behalf of any person liable to a tax on wagers. In
addition the act required every person subject to the tax to register with
the appropriate Collector of Internal Revenue and in connection with
his registration to furnish certain information specified in the act. De-
fendants challenged the validity of the act contending that it was not de-
signed as a revenue measure but that its true purpose was to obtain in-
formation concerning gambling activities and thereby assist the states in
enforcing the criminal law against gamblers. On appeal it was held that
the judiciary is without power to scrutinize the motives and purposes
of the legislative branch of the government, and since the government was
in fact deriving an income from the tax, it was a valid exercise of
Congress' power to tax. United States v. Robinson, 107 F. Supp. 38
(E.D. Mich. 1952).
The power to tax granted Congress by the Constitution is extremely
broad.- This power is not restricted by either the Fifth 3 or Tenth Am-
endment. 4 It is not outside the ambit of Congressional power to levy
taxes which possess some incidental regulatory, suppressive or restrictive
effect.5 Nor is a primarily regulatory statute which in fact raises revenue
invalid so long as the act falls within the scope of powers delegated to
Congress.6 But where the primary purpose of the act, obviously hidden
under the cloak of the taxing power, has infringed upon the residual
powers of the states, the decisions have not been in complete accord. A
recent Supreme Court decision upheld an act of Congress in which the
860 (D. Minn. 1949) (defendant ordered to furnish refrigerator cars); Marks v.
Golden Horn Realty Co., 92 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1949) (provide doorman service).
1. 26 U.S.C. §3290.
2. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §8; see License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471 (U.S. 1866)
taxing power limited only by rule of apportionment of direct taxes, rule of uniformity
of indirect taxes, and prohibition against export taxes).
3. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915); see Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 282 U.S. 40, 44 (1934) (upheld state oleomargerine tax).
4. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (upheld federal estate tax);
sec United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1940).
5. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) "Undoubtedly every tax which
lays its burdens on some and not others may have an incidental regulatory effect.";
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) "An act of Congress which on
its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the
tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed."; Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
8 Wall. 533 (U.S. 1869).
6. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940) (power of taxation
used as a sanction for exercise of commerce power); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
596 (1884) (tax not void because used as expedient regulation of commerce); see Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
revenue purpose was secondary and where the activity regulated was one
which Congress could not otherwise regulate. 7 Many earlier decisions had
refused to sanction such usurpation of state powers.8 In fact the statute
under consideration in the instant case was declared unconstitutional by one
federal court ? as an invasion of state police powers.
The court in the instant case relies on four landmark cases 10 in up-
holding the validity of the act under scrutiny. Chief Justice Taft, in the
Child Labor Tax Case," distinguished three of these cases from a case
where the object of a tax is manifestly a regulation of a state concern. The
fourth of these cases is predicated upon the principle that inquiry into
statutory motivation is outside the competency of the courts.12  This doc-
trine has received support from any decisions 13 but is difficult to recon-
cile with other decisions where the true regulatory character of the act
is ascribed to it regardless of denomination imposed by the legislative
branch. 1 4 In addition to the instant case, the act under consideration
has been upheld in two Federal District Court decisions in California 1c
Those decisions were based on the concept that Congress may affect local
activities or occupations by imposing a tax or license fee.16
The fine line of distinction where a taxing act exceeds the powers
entrusted to Congress and treads upon those reserved to the states pre-
sents a situation where reasonable minds may differ. But in view of the
three to one majority of Federal District Courts upholding the act, and
the liberal tendency of present day courts, it is likely that the act under
consideration would be declared valid if considered by the Supreme Court.
HAROLD 0. BULLIS
7. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (upheld marijuana transfer tax).
8. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936) (attempted regulation
of bituminous coal industry through tax power invaded states' rights); United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (Congress cannot impose penalty for violation of
state law); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).
9. Upited States v. Kahriger, 105 F.Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (recognized the
subject matter as within the scope of federal authority, but held that the act went far
beyond mere taxation).
10. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86 (1919); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U.S. 1869).
11. 259 U.S. 20, 40 (1922) (in discussing the Veazie case, he stated "what was
charged to be the object of the excessive tax was within the Congressional authority.")
(in reference to the McCray case, ". . . the law objected to does not show on its face
as does the law before us the detailed specifications of a regulation of a state
concern . . .") (concerning the Doremus case, "'. . . the court, there, made manifest
its view that the . . . act must be naturally and reasonably adapted to the collection of
the tax and not solely to the achievement of some other purpose plainly within state
power.").
12. See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
13. E.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (where tax purports to
be a revenue measure, it is not within province of courts to inquire into Congressional
motives); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919) (reasonable relation to
tax power sufficient); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
14. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) "A penalty cannot
be converted into a tax by so naming it . . ."; United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S.
568 (1931) (liquor regulation); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315 (U.S. 1819).
15. United States v. Smith, 106 F.Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v.
Nadler, 105 F.Supp. 918 (N.D. Cal. 1952). 1
16, Cf. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (upheld tax levied
as a sanction to enforce The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act).
